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Abstract 
 
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA) prohibits indirect and 
direct unfair discrimination in terms of the grounds listed in the 
act (such as race, sex, and sexual orientation) as well as unlisted 
grounds (which are to be alleged and proven by an applicant). 
South African courts had also grappled with the specific issue of 
indirect unfair discrimination prior to the enactment of PEPUDA, 
where applicants could rely on the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 directly. This is evident in cases such as 
Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC) and S v 
Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC). This contribution is an analysis of 
the pioneering judgment in Social Justice Coalition v Minister of 
Police 2019 4 SA 82 (WCC) (SCJ case), wherein a South African 
court for the first time recognised poverty as a ground of indirect 
discrimination under PEPUDA. This conclusion flows from the 
court's finding, based on expert evidence that the formula used 
to allocate police resources in the Western Cape unfairly 
discriminates against poor and Black people in an indirect 
manner. The analysis of the SCJ judgment will take place 
against the backdrop of the antidiscrimination framework under 
PEPUDA and direct constitutional litigation that predates 
PEPUDA. The underlying theme of intersectionality will also be 
discussed, as it was apparent from a reading of the SCJ case 
that grounds of discrimination often intersect with one another 
and disproportionately affect certain groups of people. 
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1 Introduction 
The status of South Africa as a country marred by violence is uncontested. 
Cape Town, which is situated in the Western Cape and is the focus of this 
discussion, has recently been identified as having the eleventh highest 
murder rate in the world.1 Overall, inhabitants of the country as a whole also 
do not feel safe. Research confirms that only 31% of South Africans feel 
safe, ranking South Africa amongst post-conflict areas such as Afghanistan 
(20%) and Liberia (40%).2 
One of the key factors affecting both the presence of and resistance against 
crime is the police force. The lack of an adequately staffed police force 
inevitably leads to an increase in crime.3 In 2015 it was reported that up to 
85% of police stations in the Western Cape were understaffed,4 while in 
2018 the National Commissioner of Police noted a national deficit of 62 000 
police officers.5 The Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police 
Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the 
Community of Khayelitsha (the Khayelitsha Commission) also highlighted 
this issue in their 2014 report.6 It is noteworthy that areas where the majority 
                                            
  Delano Cole van der Linde. LLB LLM LLD (Stell). Lecturer, Faculty of Law, North-
West University, South Africa. Email: delano.vanderlinde@nwu.ac.za. 
1  Martell 2019 http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/seguridad/1564-boletin-
ranking. 
2  Gallup 2018 https://news.gallup.com/reports/235310/gallup-global-law-order-report-
2018.aspx 5. 
3  See Pienaar, Du Plessis and Olivier 2014 SAPL 566. 
4  Plato 2015 https://www.westerncape.gov.za/news/police%E2%80%99s-gang-
strategy-not-stopping-scourge-gang-and-drug-related-crimes. 
5  Pitt 2018 https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/crime-stats-call-for-more-
police-for-the-poor-as-murder-rate-climbs-20180911. 
6  Khayelitsha Commission 2014 https://www.saferspaces.org.za/resources/entry/ 
towards-a-safer-khayelitsha-report-of-the-khayeitsha-commission-of-inquiry 
(Khayelitsha Commission Towards a Safer Khayelitsha). The Constitutional Court in 
Minister of Police v Premier of the Western Cape 2014 1 SA 1 (CC) para 4 
summarised the complaints that led to the establishment of the Commission of 
Inquiry as follow: "The complaint contained statistics showing high and escalating 
crime rates, with particular concern over figures relating to homicides, assaults and 
sexual crimes. Various and serious inefficiencies in policing were claimed, including 
insufficient visible policing in the community, lack of witness protection, lack of 
coordination between the police and prosecuting services and poor treatment of 
victims of crimes. The complaint described the routine violation of the rights of the 
residents of Khayelitsha and highlighted the impact of high crime rates on residents, 
including children and people vulnerable to discrimination. It added that 'the 
[Khayelitsha] community has lost confidence in the ability of the police to protect 
them from crime, and to investigate crimes once they have occurred'. The civil 
society organisations concerned proposed that the premier appoint a commission of 
inquiry into the Police Service and Metro Police operating in Khayelitsha." [footnotes 
omitted] Also see Social Justice Coalition v Minister of Police 2019 4 SA 82 (WCC) 
fn 5. 
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of the inhabitants were living in poverty had a much weaker police presence 
than more affluent areas in Cape Town. The population of the latter had the 
benefits of a stronger economy and the areas had lower crime rates as well 
as disproportionately better staffed police stations. The Commission noted 
in this regard that 
… the residents of the poorest areas of Cape Town that bore the brunt of 
apartheid are still woefully under-policed twenty years into our new democracy 
and are often the police stations with the highest levels of serious contact 
crime. This pattern needs to change as a matter of urgency.7 
And also: 
One of the questions that has most troubled the Commission is how a system 
of human resource allocation that appears to be systematically biased against 
poor black communities could have survived twenty years into our post-
apartheid democracy.8 
The topic at hand is the litigation that ensued subsequent to the findings of 
the Khayelitsha Commission – specifically the case of Social Justice 
Coalition v Minister of Police (hereafter the SCJ case).9 This article will 
explore the finding of the Western Cape High Court (acting as an Equality 
Court) that the theoretical human resources requirement (THRR) formula 
utilised to determine the police allocation nationally and provincially unfairly 
indirectly discriminated against poor and Black people. This is the first time 
a South African court has explicitly found that poverty is a ground of unfair 
discrimination. In part 2 of this article, I contextualise the law relating to 
unfair discrimination in South Africa, and then engage in a discussion, in 
part 3, of the most pertinent facts and findings of the Equality Court. 
Subsequently, in parts 4 and 5, I endeavour to identify and comment on the 
concept of intersectionality due to the overlapping categories of race and 
poverty. Part 6 concludes this article. 
2 The law relating to discrimination 
2.1 Generally 
The applicants in the SCJ case sought an order inter alia declaring that the 
"allocation of police human resources in the Western Cape unfairly 
discriminates against Black and poor people on the basis of race and 
poverty" and further 
                                            
7  Khayelitsha Commission Towards a Safer Khayelitsha 449. 
8  Khayelitsha Commission Towards a Safer Khayelitsha 394. 
9  Social Justice Coalition v Minister of Police 2019 4 SA 82 (WCC) (the SCJ case). 
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[d]eclaring that the system employed by the South African Police Service to 
determine the allocation of police human resources unfairly discriminates 
against Black and poor people on the basis of race and poverty.10 
Discrimination is prohibited both under the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) and in terms of legislation. 
The Constitution holds that: 
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.11 
These grounds are known as the so-called "listed grounds". The 
Constitution further enjoins the Legislature to enact legislation to prevent or 
prohibited unfair discrimination.12 This legislation was enacted in the form 
of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 
of 2000 (PEPUDA) and places a general prohibition on unfair discrimination, 
stating that: "[n]either the State nor any person may unfairly discriminate 
against any person."13 The same "listed grounds" are also contained in 
PEPUDA and are referred to as "prohibited grounds".14 It is possible under 
PEPUDA (and previously under the Constitution directly) for an applicant to 
allege that unfair discrimination took place on any ground including grounds 
other than the listed or prohibited grounds – a fact which will be discussed 
below. 
2.2  Indirect discrimination 
Although neither the Constitution nor PEPUDA specifically defines direct or 
indirect discrimination, both make provision for them. Direct discrimination 
requires no further elucidation, but indirect discrimination does. Indirect 
discrimination occurs when the differential treatment due to conduct, 
practices, or in this case, the application of legislation, seems innocent or 
neutral, but the impact of the differential treatment is discriminatory.15 The 
most illustrious example of indirect discrimination in case law is Pretoria City 
Council v Walker (hereafter the Walker case).16 The respondents in this 
                                            
10  SCJ case para 2. 
11  Section 9(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution) (emphasis added). 
12  Section 9(4) of the Constitution. 
13  Section 6 of Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000 (PEPUDA). 
14  Section 1 of PEPUDA. 
15  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 238; Govindjee and Vrancken 
Introduction to Human Rights Law 77. 
16  Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC) (the Walker case). 
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case contended that the different methods used to calculate monthly dues 
for municipal services (water and electricity) were discriminatory on the 
basis of race. Two methods were used: actual consumption and a uniform 
rate per household.17 Consumption meters were used to determine actual 
consumption and were installed in the suburbs of "old Pretoria" (such as 
Constantia Park), where the respondents resided. It was common cause 
that the residents of old Pretoria were predominantly White. Due to the lack 
of consumption meters, the townships of Mamelodi and Atteridgeville were 
billed on the uniform rate – which was a flat rate and therefore generally 
lower, as it was fixed regardless of usage. The population of these 
townships was Black.18 The Constitutional Court ultimately agreed with the 
respondents and found that, although not directly or overtly discriminatory, 
the differentiation was indeed unfairly discriminatory, albeit indirectly. Langa 
DP (as he then was) held that: 
It is sufficient for the purposes of this judgment to say that this conduct which 
differentiated between the treatment of residents of townships which were 
historically black areas and whose residents are still overwhelmingly black, 
and residents in municipalities which were historically white areas and whose 
residents are still overwhelmingly white constituted indirect discrimination on 
the grounds of race. The fact that the differential treatment was made 
applicable to geographical areas rather than to persons of a particular race 
may mean that the discrimination was not direct, but it does not in my view 
alter the fact that in the circumstances of the present case it constituted 
discrimination, albeit indirect, on the grounds of race. It would be artificial to 
make a comparison between an area known to be overwhelmingly a 'black 
area' and another known to be overwhelmingly a 'white area', on the grounds 
of geography alone. The effect of apartheid laws was that race and geography 
were inextricably linked and the application of a geographical standard, 
although seemingly neutral, may in fact be racially discriminatory. In this case, 
its impact was clearly one which differentiated in substance between black 
residents and white residents. The fact that there may have been a few black 
residents in old Pretoria does not detract from this.19 
He made it quite clear that the differential rates were geographically related. 
However, racial groups were (and still are often) clustered in geographical 
areas due to the lingering impact of apartheid, which enforced racial 
segregation.20 The differential rates therefore disfavoured a particular racial 
group, albeit through the application of neutral geographical differentiation. 
                                            
17  Walker case para 4. 
18  Walker case paras 4-5. 
19  Walker case para 32. 
20  In particular, the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950.  
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The geographic, racial divide was also glaringly apparent in the SCJ case 
which will be discussed further below.21 
An allegation of indirect discrimination was also made in S v Jordan.22 This 
case concerned a multi-pronged challenge to the criminalisation of sex 
work,23 but for the purposes of this article, only the aspect relating to unfair 
and indirect gender discrimination will be discussed. Before the 
promulgation of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (SORMAA), which criminalises the act of 
engaging a person for sexual services (being the recipient of such services 
or a client),24 sex work was directly criminalised only insofar as it related to 
the sex worker (the provider of the sexual services) under the Sexual 
Offences Act 23 of 1957 (Sexual Offences Act).25 As far as the client was 
concerned, if charged and prosecuted at all, he or she would be prosecuted 
only as a conspirator in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 
(RAA).26 In fact, at the time of the Constitutional Court's decision in Jordan, 
which was late 2002, the state could not substantiate its case with one 
instance where a client had been prosecuted since the promulgation of the 
impugned provision in 1988.27 The majority of the Constitutional Court (per 
Ngcobo J) found that the provision under the Sexual Offences Act was 
                                            
21  See Part 3.2 below. Also see SCJ case para 90, where the Court stated that: "25 
years into our democracy people, Black people in particular, still live under conditions 
which existed during the apartheid system of government. The dawn of democracy 
has not changed the lot of the people of Khayelitsha. They continue to live in informal 
settlements where the provisions of services are non-existent or at a minimum. This 
is more glaring where a comparison is made with the more affluent areas, mainly 
occupied by the privileged minority. Such a comparison brings to the fore the stark 
reality of abject poverty. The unfortunate reality is that the residences of Khayelitsha, 
who are predominantly Black, continue to receive inferior services, including services 
from the SAPS. The SAPS discriminates against this impoverished community by 
using a system of human resources allocation." 
22  S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) (the Jordan case). 
23  The terms "sex worker" and "sex work" shall be used in this contribution instead of 
"prostitute" and "prostitution" because the latter has been described as humiliating, 
degrading and hurtful. See Tenga and Wasserman 2017 
https://genderjustice.org.za/publication/health-safety-guide-clients-sex-workers/; 
HRW 2019 https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/southafrica0819_ 
web_0.pdf. 
24  Section 11 of Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 
32 of 2007 (SORMAA) reads as follows: "A person ('A') who unlawfully and 
intentionally engages the services of a person 18 years or older ('B'), for financial or 
other reward, favour or compensation to B or to a third person ('C')- (a) for the 
purpose of engaging in a sexual act with B, irrespective of whether the sexual act is 
committed or not; or (b) by committing a sexual act with B, is guilty of the offence of 
engaging the sexual services of a person 18 years or older." 
25  Section 20(1)(aA) of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. 
26  Section 18(2)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 (the RAA). 
27  Jordan case para 42. 
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gender-neutral and was therefore applicable to both men and women, and 
the legislative intent was to outlaw commercial sex. Since the sex worker is 
the one engaged in the business of commercial sex and not the client, the 
prohibition is aimed at the sex worker (who is "likely to be a repeat offender") 
and not the client ("[who] may or may not be a repeat offender").28 It was 
further held that the client is subject to the same punishment as the principal 
offender under the RAA and that there is, in fact, no distinction; the client 
and the sex worker are equally liable, and both are subject to the same 
punishment.29 The finding that there is no distinction between the client's 
punishment and that of the sex worker is patently false, as is evident from 
the fact that there were no cases against the clients at all. In practice, a 
conspirator (in this case the client) usually receives a more lenient sentence 
than the perpetrator (the sex worker).30 This is due to the fact that the 
conduct of the conspirator is considered less harmful or reprehensible 
because his conduct has not manifested into a complete crime.31 There is 
no prohibition against being charged with both conspiracy and the 
substantive crime, but one cannot be convicted of both.32 Considering that 
the client can at most be found guilty of conspiracy, he could never receive 
equal punishment for what is essentially equally criminal conduct. This was 
a distasteful scenario because the client and sex worker engaged in the 
same conduct, but for the payment/receipt of a fee. 
The majority in Jordan also rejected submissions regarding the 
prosecutorial and police practices where only the sex worker is prosecuted 
and held that that was not the issue under consideration. The issue was the 
potential unconstitutionality of the vexed provision of the Sexual Offences 
Act and that the prosecutorial practices were an issue pertaining to the 
application of the law and not to the law itself.33 It was consequently found 
that the vexed provision was not unconstitutional.34 
This was an unfortunate outcome as the scenario in Jordan was a textbook 
instance of indirect discrimination. When considering the constitutionality of 
an impugned provision, it cannot be viewed in a legal vacuum devoid of its 
real-world application. The truth of the matter is that most sex workers are 
female (and, as will be illustrated below, women are most often the victims 
                                            
28  Jordan case paras 8-10. 
29  Jordan case para 13. 
30  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 546 fn 55.  
31  See Snyman Criminal Law 289. 
32  See S v Agliotti 2011 2 SACR 437 (GSJ) para 9.3. 
33  Jordan case para 19. 
34  In terms of s 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
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of poverty)35 and, although the conspiratorial conduct of the male client is 
punishable under the RAA, such prosecution, on the facts before the court, 
had never occurred. This application therefore has a disproportionate and 
unfairly discriminatory effect. Whether or not the sex worker is the "supplier", 
as per Ngcobo's analogy, this does not ameliorate the fact that at the time 
of a particular transaction of sex work, both parties are engaging in the exact 
same conduct, save for the fact that one receives money and the other pays 
it. The event is not analogous to drug dealing, where there are wholly 
different acts involved in the unlawful conduct. 
The minority held differently: 
In the present case, the stigma is prejudicial to women and runs along the 
fault lines of archetypal presuppositions about male and female behaviour, 
thereby fostering gender inequality. To the extent therefore that prostitutes are 
directly criminally liable in terms of s 20(1)(aA) while customers, if liable at all, 
are only indirectly criminally liable as accomplices or co-conspirators, the 
harmful social prejudices against women are reflected and reinforced. 
Although the difference may on its face appear to be a difference of form, it is 
in our view a difference of substance that stems from and perpetuates gender 
stereotypes in a manner which causes discrimination. The inference is that 
the primary cause of the problem is not the man who creates the demand but 
the woman who responds to it: she is fallen, he is at best virile, at worst weak. 
Such discrimination, therefore, has the potential to impair the fundamental 
human dignity and personhood of women.36 
Both the minority and the majority referred to the differing societal views of 
the participants in sex work, where there is greater stigma – and most often 
harsher criminal sanction – on the sex worker.37 This affronts the principle 
of fair labelling. The principle of fair labelling dictates that the sanction 
imposed on an offender must adequately reflect what he or she has done.38 
No fair labelling can be said to have been present under the old regime of 
the Sexual Offences Act in conjunction with the RAA. 
Both these cases illustrate the intersectionality of poverty with other 
categories of deprivation. The inhabitants of Mamelodi and Atteridgeville 
were predominantly Black and poor. The sex workers under discussion in 
Jordan were predominantly female and had resorted to sex work whilst 
                                            
35  Part 5 below. 
36  Jordan case para 65. 
37  Jordan case para 16. 
38  Kemp Criminal Law 21. Kemp points out that this principle has not received formal 
or explicit recognition in South Africa but can be seen as founded in the right to 
human dignity in terms of s 10 of the Constitution. Also see Van der Linde Criminal 
Gang Activities 44-45, 55. 
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grappling with poverty. The intersectionality between poverty and other 
categories of discrimination will be discussed below.39 
2.3 Unlisted or unspecified prohibited grounds 
As mentioned above, discrimination can occur on one or more of the listed 
or prohibited grounds. Under the Constitution, when dealing with a listed 
ground of discrimination, the unfairness is presumed and the onus would 
then shift to the respondent to show that the conduct, practice, law and the 
like was fair.40 Similarly, under PEPUDA, if the complainant proved a prima 
facie case of discrimination, the respondent must either prove that the 
discrimination did not take place as the claimant has alleged41 or that the 
vexed conduct is not based on one or more of the prohibited grounds.42 If a 
court finds that the discrimination based on a prohibited ground did in fact 
take place, however, a presumption of unfairness arises and the onus shifts 
to the respondent to prove that the discrimination is fair.43 
If it is not a listed (or prohibited) ground, then it will be automatically unfair 
if one or more of the following conditions are met:44 
any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground- 
(i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; 
(ii) undermines human dignity; or 
(iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person's rights and 
freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable to discrimination on a 
ground in paragraph (a) […]45 
The discrimination will also not qualify as unfair if the respondent disproves 
it.46 The following factors must be taken into account when a court 
determines whether a respondent has proven that the discrimination is fair: 
(a) The context; 
(b) the factors referred to in subsection (3); 
                                            
39  See Part 5 below. 
40  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 224. 
41  Section 13(1)(a) of PEPUDA. 
42  Section 13(1)(b) of PEPUDA. 
43  Section 13(2)(a) of PEPUDA. 
44  Section 13(2)(b)(i) of PEPUDA. 
45  Section 1 of PEPUDA. Paragraph (a) here refers to the listed grounds as quoted 
above.  
46  Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of PEPUDA. 
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(c) whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates 
between persons according to objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic 
to the activity concerned.47 
The nine factors mentioned in paragraph (b) are whether the discriminatory 
conduct either impairs or is likely to impair human dignity;48 the impact or 
likely impact on the complainant;49 whether the complainant suffers from 
patterns of disadvantage or belongs to such a group (his or her position in 
society);50 the nature and extent of the discriminatory conduct;51 whether it 
is of a systematic nature;52 whether the discriminatory conduct has a 
legitimate purpose;53 the availability of less restrictive or less 
disadvantageous means to achieve the same purpose;54 whether and to 
what extent the alleged discrimination has achieved its purpose;55 and 
whether (if at all) and to what extent the respondent has taken reasonable 
steps to address the disadvantages that arose due to one or several of the 
prohibited grounds56 and to accommodate diversity.57 
The subsequent sections will deal with the most pertinent facts of the SCJ 
case, including the most relevant role players involved, the formula used to 
determine police distribution in South Africa, and the court's engagement 
with the issue of unfair discrimination.  
3 The facts of the case 
3.1 Relevant role players 
The applicants were public interest groups. The first applicant was the 
Social Justice Coalition – a non-profit and nongovernmental organisation. 
The second applicant, Equal Education, was also a nongovernmental 
organisation. The third applicant was the Nyanga Community Policing 
Forum.58 
                                            
47  Section 14(2) of PEPUDA. 
48  Section 14(3)(a) of PEPUDA. 
49  Section 14(3)(b) of PEPUDA. 
50  Section 14(3)(c) of PEPUDA. 
51  Section 14(3)(d) of PEPUDA. 
52  Section 14(3)(e) of PEPUDA. 
53  Section 14(3)(f) of PEPUDA. 
54  Section 14(3)(h) of PEPUDA. 
55  Section 14(3)(g) of PEPUDA. 
56  Section 14(3)(i)(i) of PEPUDA. 
57  Section 14(3)(i)(ii) of PEPUDA. 
58  The South African Police Act 68 of 1995 (the SAPS Act) governs its establishment. 
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The national and provincial police leadership is structured in a manner one 
could only describe as a bureaucratic matrix. The respondents were all 
governmental functionaries.59 The first respondent was the Minister of 
Police. He was joined as a respondent as he is enjoined through the 
Constitution60 to oversee policing throughout the jurisdiction of the Republic. 
The National Commissioner of Police was cited as the second respondent 
as he was enjoined through both legislation61 and the Constitution62 for 
"controlling and managing the police service". The third respondent was the 
Provincial Commissioner of Police in the Western Cape. His duties, like 
those of the National Minister, are informed by the Constitution63 and the 
South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (SAPS Act).64 No relief was 
sought against the fourth respondent, the Minister of Community Safety 
(Western Cape). He was joined, however, because of his duties of oversight 
of the South African Police Service (SAPS) in terms of the Constitution.65 
3.2 Overview of the formula used to determine police resources 
SAPS engages in two phases of human resource allocation. The first phase 
is a theoretical allocation and denotes the calculation "of the number of 
posts per level required to perform the duties associated with police 
stations."66 This was said to indicate the ideal distribution of human 
resources, had there been no budgetary constraints.67 Firstly, crime 
statistics from the police stations across the country are gathered. Without 
going into specificity, SAPS indicated that this information includes "a wide 
range of determinants". It includes, most significantly, the average incidence 
of all reported crime at every police station over a period of four years – with 
the most recent year weighing the most in the formula. The subsequent 
formulas, weighting, and ratios are applied in order to determine the number 
of police officers required in order to satisfy the theoretical crime prevention 
requirements.68 
The evidence submitted to the court indicated that one police officer post is 
allocated for an average of twenty reported contact crimes per month and 
one post for every 25 property-related crimes. One post is further allocated 
                                            
59  See the SCJ case paras 6-9. 
60  Sections 205 and 206 of the Constitution. 
61  Sections 6(1) and 11 of the SAPS Act.  
62  Section 207 of the Constitution. 
63  Section 207(4) of the Constitution. 
64  Sections 6(2) and 12 of the SAPS Act. 
65  Section 206 of the Constitution. 
66  SCJ case para 21. 
67  SCJ case para 22.10. 
68  SCJ case para 22.1. 
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for every 35 reported serious crimes and one post for every 50 less serious 
crimes.69 The crime-related data then give the police a baseline figure. 
This baseline figure is then utilised in a demographic analysis comprising of 
79 demographic determinants. These determinants are not crime statistics 
but are demographical determinants that may influence the incidence of 
crime in a particular area. SAPS further alleged that greater weighting is 
given to these factors in underdeveloped areas than in developed or affluent 
areas.70 
The population and geographical size of the area serviced by a particular 
police station, the unemployment rate and the size of the informal population 
are amongst the first determinants considered. Further determinants, and 
these are important for the purpose of this discussion, include the presence 
of commuters, and the presence of venues and facilities used for hosting 
sports, religious, and other recreational events, as well as whether there is 
a seasonal influx of people present in the particular area. These would 
primarily be holiday visitors. Geographical factors are also considered, such 
as mountains and rivers that may hamper the execution of the duties of the 
police.71 
Another important factor in the calculation is ostensible socio-economic 
considerations such as the lack of roads and streetlights and/or 
telecommunication and social degradation. The presence of informal 
housing is also considered, as this is often associated with a lack of access 
routes and street names. Lastly, the number of identified gangs is included 
under socio-economic considerations. Although there was no specific 
mention of gangs in this case, it was considered in the initial Report by the 
Khayelitsha Commission.72 Criminal gang activity contributes 
disproportionately to the crime statistics in the Western Cape, with 
approximately 23,6% of murders committed in the Province during the 
2018/2019 financial year being gang-related.73 The gang crisis in the Cape 
Flats led to the deployment of the South African National Defence Force in 
                                            
69  SCJ case para 22.2. 
70  SCJ case paras 22.3.-4 
71  SCJ case para 22.5.1. 
72  Khayelitsha Commission Towards a Safer Khayelitsha 168, 271, 340-342, 457.  
73  SAPS 2019 https://www.saps.gov.za/services/april_to_march2018_19_ 
presentation.pdf. 938 of the 3 974 murders committed in the Province were attributed 
to gangs. Also see Van der Linde 2019 https://theconversation.com/why-a-law-
designed-to-fight-gang-violence-in-south-africa-cant-do-the-job-111568. 
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July 2019 in an attempt to stabilise gang hot spots due to more than 900 
gang-related murders being committed in the first half of 2019 alone.74 
Another cluster of determinants which can also be described broadly as 
socio-economic factors are the areas where people assemble. These 
include malls, airports, overnight accommodation, places were liquor is sold 
and consumed (either lawfully or unlawfully), educational facilities, and 
whether there are outlets that are permitted to sell firearms in the area.75 
Lastly listed by SAPS were areas that the police were under a statutory 
obligation to police, such as farms and smallholdings, as well as abattoirs.76 
Experts are then consulted to ascertain how many investigations of a 
particular crime a theoretical detective would be able to conduct each 
month. This result subsequently leads to a theoretical detective 
requirement, where ratios are applied to particular forms of crime. For 
example, one detective is theoretically allocated for every murder and one 
for every ten robberies.77 
With the theoretical numbers in mind, underdeveloped areas are then 
favoured, according to SAPS. Factors such as the distances the police need 
to travel to reach collateral service in the investigative process are 
considered (for example, the distance between hospitals and forensic 
laboratories).78 
A contingency allowance is also factored in for police officers. This 
allowance includes meetings, procurement, interaction with other officers, 
and reporting for and being off duty, as well as recovery from fatigue and 
compulsory leave.79 
As stated above, the result of this morass of determinants, factors and 
considerations is the ideal allocation where budgetary constraints are not a 
consideration. The second phase, naturally, would involve the actual 
allocation of police posts, which is informed by the available budget. It was 
alleged that disadvantaged areas would, considering the determinants and 
                                            
74  Haysom and Shaw 2019 https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/under 
standing-cape-towns-gang-problem-and-why-a-military-crackdown-could-make-
things-worse-20190714; Felix 2019 https://ewn.co.za/2019/07/12/sandf-lands-in-
gang-stricken-cape-town. 
75  SCJ case para 22.5.3. 
76  SCJ case para 22.5.4. 
77  SCJ case paras 22.6-7. 
78  SCJ case para 22.8. 
79  SCJ case para 22.9. 
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considerations, on average receive one post for every 2 500 members of 
the community instead of 1 per 5 000, as with non-disadvantaged areas.80 
The consideration of the THRR for all police stations in the country provided 
the national requirement for both the number of posts as well as the ranks.81 
After the national allocation, the provinces bear the responsibility of 
distributing the funded posts. SAPS indicated that THRR and other factors 
such as crime trends and patterns are given due consideration, but that the 
distribution is "a dynamic and flexible process".82 
From a reading of the case as a whole combined with the description of 
SAPS, particularly of their resource allocation, it follows that the underlying 
and explicit supposition is that the allocation, save for the purposeful 
weighing in favour of underprivileged areas, is entirely neutral and done with 
reference to objective and neutral determinants. As will be shown in the 
following sections, the determinants seem on the surface to be quite 
innocuous, but their impact on the allocation of police resources is anything 
but neutral. 
3.3 The expert evidence by Jean Redpath83 
The expert witness initially testified at the Khayelitsha Commission about 
the skewed allocation of police resources in Khayelitsha and other areas 
predominantly occupied by Black people as a result of using the THRR.84 
Redpath made the crucial observation of the unfortunate cycle in areas such 
as Khayelitsha. The cycle starts with a significant underreporting of crimes 
in these areas, which would, in turn, lead to less police resources being 
allocated. In other words, areas where there are low levels of police 
resources would have low levels of reporting and therefore less additional 
resources would be allocated to them. Areas that already had an oversupply 
of resources would have better reporting and therefore would receive more 
resources due to the better reporting rates.85 This is an inescapable cycle 
that benefits certain areas more than others as a result of the operation of 
the THRR. 
                                            
80  SCJ case para 23. 
81  SCJ case para 44. 
82  SCJ case para 24. 
83  See Redpath 2014 https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/ 
documents/14434/28-a-jean-redpath-transcript.pdf for the transcript of Ms 
Redpath's testimony before the Khayelitsha Commission relating to police resource 
allocation. Also see Redpath and Nagia-Luddy 2015 SACQ 15-26. 
84  SCJ case para 43. 
85  SCJ case para 44. 
DC VAN DER LINDE  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  15 
Redpath's calculations were represented as the number of police staff per 
100 000 members of the population. The average number of police 
members was 283 for every 100 000 people – with the lowest incidence 
being in Harare (111 police members per 100 000 people) and the highest 
in Table Bay Harbour (2 636 police members per 100 000 people). 
Khayelitsha had an incidence of 190 police members for every 100 000 and 
Lingelethu-West 275 police members per 100 000 people. Areas like 
Khayelitsha, which also contained informal settlements and were subject to 
serious and violent crime, were also noted to be understaffed.86 
It was also pointed out that the budget could not accommodate the THRR 
requirements for police stations – only 68% could be satisfied at every police 
station. 
The THRR factors and determinants, albeit prima facie objectives, had 
anything but neutral outcomes. Redpath indicated that unlike formal areas 
(predominantly populated by non-Black and more affluent persons), only 15 
of the factors weighed in favour of informal areas. Formal areas have a 
potential additional weighting of up to 205%, while informal areas have a 
potential additional weighting of 75%, according to Redpath.87 For example, 
informal areas will have a lower incidence of incoming commuters, malls, 
airports, overnight accommodation, and a seasonal influx of people 
(holidaymakers). These factors are more frequently found in affluent areas 
and therefore skew police allocation in favour of those areas. Further, poor 
Black people do not inhabit these areas. 
Poverty and informal housing were also considered to bolster the finding 
that police resourcing is disproportionate.88 Redpath found, unsurprisingly, 
that a high incidence of piped water and electricity correlated with formal 
housing while a low incidence of these resources correlated with informal 
housing. She further submitted that historically, Black people tend to live in 
informal housing which, as was pointed out, had a lower level of service 
provision. And further, that lower levels of service provision also correlated 
significantly with lower levels of police resources.89 
The court was satisfied that Redpath's research proved the skewed 
allocation of police resources based on the grounds given.90 
                                            
86  SCJ case para 43. 
87  SCJ case para 51. 
88  Redpath used data from both the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. 
89  SCJ case paras 52-53. 
90  See SCJ case paras 77 and 87. 
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3.4 How the court in SCJ dealt with the issue of unfair discrimination 
The applicants relied on two grounds of discrimination, namely race and 
poverty.91 Race, of course, is a prohibited ground under PEPUDA and 
unfairness was consequently presumed. Poverty, however, is an 
unspecified or unlisted ground. There had also never been an instance 
where a court has recognised poverty directly as a ground of 
discrimination.92 The applicants therefore had to satisfy the court, as 
described above, that the unspecified ground of poverty has the effect of 
causing or perpetuating systemic disadvantage; that poverty undermines 
human dignity; or that poverty has the effect of negatively impacting on 
someone's "rights and freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable to 
discrimination on a ground in paragraph (a)."93 
The applicants submitted that, although there had never been an instance 
where poverty was expressly recognised as a ground of discrimination, 
there had been several instances where the Constitutional Court (before the 
promulgation of PEPUDA) had by relying on analogous grounds found in 
favour of applicants that unfair discrimination was present.94 This alludes to 
the intersectional nature of discrimination which was pointed out in Harksen 
v Lane (hereafter the Harksen case):95 
There is often a complex relationship between these grounds. In some cases 
they relate to immutable biological attributes or characteristics, in some to the 
associational life of humans, in some to the intellectual, expressive and 
religious dimensions of humanity and in some cases to a combination of one 
or more of these features. The temptation to force them into neatly self-
contained categories should be resisted.96 
In this passage Goldstone J warns against an artificial categorisation of 
discrimination and points out that these grounds are often interrelated and 
can overlap. An unlisted category, therefore, should not be denied merely 
because of its own disadvantageous status as an unlisted ground. 
Although there is no explicit ground of poverty in PEPUDA, section 34(1) 
specifically contains a directive regarding "HIV/AIDS, nationality, socio-
economic status and family responsibility status". Socio-economic status, in 
turn, is defined as "[including] a social or economic condition or perceived 
                                            
91  SCJ case para 54. 
92  SCJ case para 58. 
93  Section 1 of PEPUDA. See section 2.1 above. 
94  SCJ case para 58. 
95  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) (the Harksen case). 
96  Harksen case para 50. 
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condition of a person who is disadvantaged by poverty, low employment 
status or lack of or low-level educational qualifications."97 These grounds 
should therefore be considered for the inclusion thereof in the list of 
prohibited grounds.98 
The applicants relied on Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu- Natal) 
(hereafter the Soobramoney case)99 for their contention that poverty in 
South Africa is systemic due to the historical context of the country,100 and 
Minister of Health v New Clicks Sought Africa (Pty) Ltd (hereafter the New 
Clicks case)101 for their contention that poverty is an affront to human 
dignity102 that adversely impacts on constitutionally-protected socio-
economic rights in a manner analogous to that of a listed ground.103 Albertyn 
and Goldblatt's link between citizenship and poverty104 in the case of Khosa 
v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social 
Development105 was also referred to.106 
The court consequently agreed with the applicants and for the first time in 
South Africa accepted poverty as a ground of unfair discrimination.107 
4 The state's response 
The state's main challenges were aimed at the expert witness. It was 
contended that she was not a policing expert and that she had relied on 
outdated statistics without taking due cognisance of applicable variables, 
including the unworkable complexities that are synonymous with policing. 
Redpath was also accused of not considering budgetary constraints 
properly. The state submitted that in its process of allocating resources, 
SAPS cannot rely solely on population and crime statistics.108 It further 
contended that the THRR in fact did not discriminate against poor and Black 
people as it was skewed in the favour of these categories of persons – and 
                                            
97  Section 1 of PEPUDA. 
98  Section 34(1)(a) of PEPUDA. 
99  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1996 1 SA 765 (CC) (the 
Soobramoney case). 
100  Soobramoney case para 8. 
101  Minister of Health v New Clicks Sought Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) (the 
New Clicks case). 
102  New Clicks case para 705. 
103  SCJ case paras 64-65. 
104  Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 35-63. 
105  Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 
2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 74. 
106  SCJ case para 62. 
107  SCJ case para 65. 
108  SCJ case para 71. 
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that the Provincial Commissioner had exercised his discretionary powers109 
to supplement these areas.110 
None of these complaints, however, addressed the empirically proven 
discriminatory impact of the THRR. The actual validity of Redpath's 
analyses was not contested. Stated differently, the state did not present any 
empirical evidence showing that areas occupied by poor and Black people 
were not disadvantaged by the THRR but in fact had been benefitted. For 
the sake of the argument, even if the figures were outdated and even if 
Redpath was not the most apt expert, the state did not even attempt to prove 
that persons living in the relevant areas were receiving sufficient or above-
average police allocation. 
The court rejected these superficial contentions and ultimately held that the 
THRR, though ostensibly operating on a neutral basis (founded in objective 
facts), had a discriminatory effect.111 The state had therefore ultimately 
failed to discharge its onus to prove that there was either no discrimination 
at all or that the discrimination was fair.112 
5 Discussion of the SCJ judgment: the underlying theme 
of intersectionality 
The court's decision in the SCJ case cannot be faulted. The applicants are 
especially commended for their vigorous pursuit of justice through a strong 
body of evidence. The jurisprudential impact that the case will have is 
undeniable. The matter of poverty as an indirect and intersectional form of 
unfair discrimination is deserving of some further discussion. 
Grounds of discrimination often overlap. The Constitutional Court in 
Harksen held that "[t]here is often a complex relationship between these 
grounds … and in some cases … a combination of one or more of these 
features." The court also warned not "to force them into neatly self-
contained categories …".113 The effect of this complex relationship and 
overlap is that of an intersectional group of persons having a unique or 
particular disadvantage.  
                                            
109  In terms of s 12(3) of the SAPS Act.  
110  SCJ case para 72. 
111  SCJ case paras 76-77. 
112  SCJ case para 87. See s 13(2)(a) and (b) of PEPUDA.  
113  Harksen case para 50. See section 3 4 above. 
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American legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw brought the concept of 
intersectionality to prominence in 1989.114 The central thesis of Crenshaw's 
paper and subsequent seminal works was that US antidiscrimination law 
tends to "treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of 
experience and analysis"115 and the status quo actually erases Black 
women from the antidiscrimination dialogue "by limiting inquiry to the 
experiences of otherwise-privileged members of the group".116 Stated 
simply, "people's disadvantage is [often] composed of multiple and 
interlocking systems of power."117 American courts failed to recognise Black 
women as a separate and distinct category of a protected class, often 
holding that either Black men (of the protected class of race) or White 
women (of the protected class gender) were not discriminated against – and 
therefore they – Black women – were not being discriminated against. 
Crenshaw points to the judgment in DeGraffenreid v General Motors 
(hereafter the DeGraffenreid case) as an example of intersectionality.118 
The recession caused an economic downturn that necessitated certain 
retrenchments to be actioned. This in turn resulted in all Black women hired 
post-1970 being fired, based on the "last hired, first fired" approach (or "last-
in-first-out" as it is known in South Africa). General Motors had started to 
hire Black women only after 1964. The effect was of course that this system 
indirectly impacted on Black women, who were already underrepresented 
in the senior work corps of the company. The court rejected the notion that 
Black women constituted a particular protected class and held that the 
plaintiffs should not be allowed "to create a new 'super-remedy' which would 
give them relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant statutes 
intended."119 And further "[that] this lawsuit must be examined to see if it 
states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or 
alternatively either, but not a combination of both."120 The court pointed out 
that General Motors had hired women prior to the promulgation of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 but neglected to take into account that no women of 
colour were hired in the period preceding the Civil Rights Act.121 Race and 
                                            
114  Crenshaw 1989 U Chi Legal F 139-167. 
115  Crenshaw 1989 U Chi Legal F 139. 
116  Crenshaw 1989 U Chi Legal F 140. 
117  Atrey 2018 HRL Rev 411. 
118  DeGraffenreid v General Motors 413 F Supp 142 (E D Mo 1976) (the De Graffenreid 
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119  The relevant statutes were the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 1964 2000a and the Civil 
War Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 1981. 
120  DeGraffenreid case143. 
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sex were inextricably linked here, because Black women were still excluded 
during the period preceding the enactment of the Civil Rights Act. 
It was also suggested by the court that this case be joined to a case 
specifically dealing with race discrimination, but the plaintiffs rejected this 
suggestion since, as Crenshaw correctly points out, it would defeat the 
object of instituting proceedings based both on race and sex and denying 
their particular form of discrimination.122 According to the Court: 
The legislative history surrounding Title VII does not indicate that the goal of 
the statute was to create a new classification of 'black women' who would have 
greater standing than, for example, a black male. The prospect of the creation 
of new classes of protected minorities, governed only by the mathematical 
principles of permutation and combination, clearly raises the prospect of 
opening the hackneyed Pandora's box.123 
The court was therefore reluctant to entertain any arguments relating to 
Black women as a class of persons specifically discriminated against. It 
even seemed to find it incomprehensible that Black women as a class of 
persons suffered a specific plight different from that of their colleagues of 
the same gender (or race). 
In the Canadian case of Sparks v Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional 
Housing Authority (hereafter the Sparks case),124 the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal had to consider whether differentiating between public and private 
sector housing legislation125 constituted discrimination for the purposes of 
section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.126 Tenants 
who lived in private sector housing had "security of tenure". If they occupied 
premises for more than five years, they could not have their lease 
agreements terminated on short notice – such as a period of one month – 
as was the case of the appellant.127 A judicial officer had to be satisfied that 
a tenant in private housing was defaulting on one or more of his/her statutory 
obligations before short-term notice would be allowed.128 This was not the 
                                            
122  Crenshaw 1989 U Chi Legal F 142. 
123  DeGraffenreid case 145. 
124  Sparks v Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional Housing Authority 1993 CanLII 3176 
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"Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, 
age or mental or physical disability." 
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128  Section 10(8)(e) of the RTA; Sparks case 4. 
DC VAN DER LINDE  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  21 
case for persons living in private housing, however. In such cases the 
legislative protections could be circumvented. 
The appellant, who lived in public housing, was a single, Black mother who 
had two children and received welfare.129 Black women on welfare 
comprised a disproportionally large percentage of the tenants in public 
housing and on the waiting list for public housing.130 
The court found that the legislation had a discriminatory effect, albeit 
"neutral on its face".131 However, discrimination here was not based on any 
of the listed categories under section 15(1) of the Charter. The court 
emphasised the fact that the legislation was neutral, but its impact was 
discriminatory on the basis of race and sex and therefore affected a large 
portion of the inhabitants of public housing. It was also pointed out that 
poverty was also experienced by these categories of persons and was 
present here, because low income was a prerequisite to qualify for public 
housing. Like the Court in SCJ, this court found that:  
The public housing tenants group as a whole is historically disadvantaged as 
a result of the combined effect of several personal characteristics listed in s. 
15(1). As a result, they are a group analogous to those persons or groups 
specifically referred to by the characteristics set out in s. 15(1) of the Charter 
being characteristics that are most commonly the subject of discrimination.132 
Intersectionality is once again patent. To be clear, it is not my submission 
here that the applicants in SCJ argued a case of intersectionality in the 
narrow sense (in other words, litigated their case based on a unique 
category of poor, Black people, as in DeGraffenreid, which concerned Black 
women). Intersectionality is rather used as a theory to describe the 
overlapping categories of discrimination, where one often impacts on the 
other or where, primarily due to historical reasons, one increases the 
likelihood of the other, and gives rise to a particular form of suffering or 
injustice. This is clear from Sparks and SCJ.  
Race and poverty were the two grounds relied on by the applicants to show 
that the THRR had an indirect discriminatory effect. Although it was not one 
of the listed grounds of discrimination, geography, just as in Walker, had an 
impact on resource allocation. In SCJ there was a seemingly neutral and 
objective allocation of resources, which was determined largely by 
geographical location. However, its effects were indirectly discriminatory 
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due to the fact that it affected mainly one race group and disadvantaged a 
particular socio-economic group. Due to South Africa's past racial 
segregation and the exclusion of this group from the economy, race, 
poverty, and geography are closely interlinked.  
The relationship between race and poverty in South Africa is well-
established and supported by empirical evidence. It is for that reason that it 
was somewhat peculiar for the applicants to rely on case law to illustrate 
systemic poverty, especially in the context of a case that turned on statistical 
analysis. In the Foreword to a Report by The World Bank,133 Dr Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma134 pointed out that although significant strides have been 
made since 1994 (the overall poverty rate is generally lower), the economy 
is still not producing sufficient jobs. The unemployment rate was 27,7% 
during the third quarter of 2017, with the youth unemployment rate being 
38,6%.135 The Report notes that these statistics are "a reminder of the reality 
that the country's socio-economic challenges are deep, structural and long-
term."136 The intersectional nature of certain categories of discrimination 
alluded to above is also patent in the findings. It was pointed out, for 
example, that in 2006 female-headed households saw a higher incidence 
of poverty (63,4%).137 Further, that Black South Africans consistently had 
the highest recorded poverty rates, with 47% of Black-headed households 
living in poverty in 2015.138 It is trite that a lack of access to education 
hampers economic prosperity. It was then also shown, unsurprisingly, that 
the levels of poverty tended to decline as the levels of education rose.139 
Furthermore, young children are most impacted upon by poverty, especially 
in multiple-children households.140 
It is therefore undeniable that poverty has an intersectional, systematic, and 
pervasive presence in South Africa. Any type of superficial analysis of these 
statistics reveals that your age, your gender, your level of education, and 
especially your race have a potential socio-economic impact in this country 
– especially if these characteristics overlap. It was therefore not far-fetched 
for the applicants in the SCJ case to contend that poverty is analogous to 
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these aforementioned listed grounds of discrimination. Particular care 
should therefore be taken in discrimination cases involving an intersectional 
class of persons. 
In contrast to the decision in SCJ, the majority in Jordan seemed 
unreceptive to the socio-economic realities of sex workers, the majority of 
whom are women (and statistically likely to be Black), and deemed the 
gender-neutral criminal sanction a mere consequence of their willingly 
engaging in illicit behaviour.141 It was therefore pleasing to see the Court in 
SCJ (like the Court in Sparks) focussing on the impact rather than just 
blindly looking at the neutral wording of the THRR. 
6 Conclusion 
The first part of this contribution detailed South Africa's antidiscrimination 
legislation under PEPUDA as it relates to listed and unlisted grounds of 
discrimination. Further, case law decided directly under the Constitution (in 
other words, predating PEPUDA) was also discussed. This legislative and 
constitutional framework was then utilised as a background to reviewing the 
SCJ judgment. The facts and judgment in SCJ, in turn, highlighted the 
underlying theme of intersectionality present in cases dealing with indirect 
discrimination, in particular race, sex and poverty. 
South African courts have shown a general willingness to engage with the 
concept of indirect unfair discrimination. They have also, save for the 
majority in Jordan, displayed an underlying understanding of and 
willingness to engage with the overlapping and intersectional nature of 
deep-rooted categories of discrimination. Our Constitution, along with 
PEPUDA, has recognised this intersectionality by providing for unlisted or 
unspecified grounds of discrimination, as it is impossible to legislate the 
broad spectrum of inequalities that may exist or develop in our society at 
any particular point in time. 
The judgment in SCJ is therefore welcomed. 
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